suggest that the long term evolution of a species depends on its social behavior. 
Here we consider an additional factor that can affect the process of crossing 95 adaptive valleys: cooperative behavior. We show that for a population subdivided 96 into demes and connected by migration, cooperation between individuals within the 97 same deme can considerably increase the rate of adaptive peak shifts. 98 We focus on a public goods form of cooperation (Kagel and Roth 1995) 
127
We model a population composed of demes connected by migration, each of size 128 . Thus the total size of the population is = ⋅ . Each generation, individuals of with probability . Setting = 1 − 1 ⁄ defines a population in which offspring 137 are uniformly distributed among all demes in every generation; setting = 0 138 determines each deme to be an effectively isolated population. 
Results

179
A fully mixed population 180 We start with the special case where demes only have two individuals ( = 2) and 181 the population is fully mixed by migration in every generation ( = 1 − 1 ⁄ ). We 182 estimate the relative difference in adaptation time due to cooperation, ρ(c). peak shift, as recombination tends to break beneficial gene combinations (Eshel and 187 Feldman 1970) . This is consistent for cooperative behavior as well (Fig. 1, cooperatives and non-cooperatives are not expected to achieve a peak shift; black areas are 208 parameters for which only non-cooperatives are expected to achieve a peak shift; blue areas 209 represent parameters for which both cooperatives and non-cooperatives achieve a peak shift, but where both cooperatives and non-cooperatives are not expected to achieve a peak shift; black areas 240 are parameters for which only non-cooperatives are expected to shift a peak; blue areas represent 241 parameters for which both cooperatives and non-cooperatives achieve a peak shift, but non-242 cooperatives do so faster. Teal to red areas are parameters for which cooperatives achieve a peak 
249
We investigated the effects of the cooperation levels, , and the cooperation benefit 250 , , on the fixation of double mutants. In Fig. 3 we break down the dynamics of the 251 double mutant fixation to the waiting for the appearance of a double mutant (Fig. 252 3A), the fixation probability of a double mutant (Fig. 3B) , and the overall time to 253 adaptation ( Fig. 3C ). For higher benefit produced from contributed resources,
values, the curves of first appearance and fixation probability become steeper (Fig. 255 3A and B). Higher values effectively diminish the influence of each genotype's 256 fitness and increase the influence of the pooled fitness. Thus, increasing "smooths" 257 the adaptive landscape and decreases the waiting time for the appearance of a 258 double mutant (Fig. 3A) . On the other hand, increasing reduces the advantage of 259 the double mutants and therefore decreases its fixation probability (Fig. 3B ).
260
Although high cooperation levels, values, substantially shorten the waiting time for 261 appearance of a double mutant, they also reduce its fixation probability. Therefore, , where ∈ { , , , }
where is the frequency of genotype in the entire population. ranges from zero 287 to one, indicating only one genotype exists or that all genotypes are found in the 288 population in equal frequencies, respectively.
289
We define the relative increase in diversity between cooperative and non-290 cooperative populations to be ( ) =
. For diversity analysis, we simulated 
322
Although there is a marked increase in diversity for a cooperative population, the Since is the wild type and is the most common genotype, and since the 527 population is fully mixed, most cooperating couples are of two individuals.
528
Therefore the fitness of most individuals is _ .
529
We normalize the fitness of all individuals relative to the most common fitness 
535
We can approximate the probability that an individual would be formed in the 536 next generation, given no other individuals exist in the current generation:
Hence, the probability that the first individual would appear in the population at 538 a certain generation, given that it had not appeared earlier is:
which can be approximated by ⋅ , where = ⋅ is the size of the population.
540
The expected time for appearance of the first individual ( ), which is 541 geometrically distributed, is:
The approximation of the average fitness, marked by ̅, is:
The progeny of an individual, marked by , is:
Therefore, if we assume that the number of offspring is Poisson distributed and its 545 mean is slightly above one (Eshel 1981; Hadany 2003) , the probability that an genotype would fixate in the population, rather than go extinct, denoted by , is 547 approximated by:
Thus we can approximate the expected time for appearance of an individual that 549 will go to fixation by:
1b. Expected progeny analysis for partners: In order for to fixate, we require that > 1. Differentiating the right hand side of (eq.s7) with respect to yields: 572 (eq.s8) In order to verify our approximations we used stochastic simulations. Fig. S1 shows 580 the results of the simulation (blue line) and the approximation (red line), for various 581 cooperation levels. This is shown for the time of first appearance of the double 582 mutant ( Fig. 2A) and the double mutant's fixation probability (Fig. 2B) , as a function 583 of the cooperation level ( ). When = 0, we are reduced to the results presented, 584 and verified against simulations, in (Hadany 2003) . We can see that our 585 approximation is accurate when increases, but it does remain slightly biased.
586
Note that both the waiting time for appearance of the double mutant and its fixation 587 probability decrease with . For deme we calculate the pool of fitness donations using matrix product:
595
Supplementary Information 2 -Simulation design
After calculating the pool we can calculate the new fitness of every individual, 635 and by that, the frequency of every genotype after applying selection. The new 
The frequency of each genotype after mutation takes place can be written as: show that cooperatives attain higher diversity during the first and the second 691 mutation-selection balances. In addition, during the takeover cooperatives reach 692 higher levels of diversity. We can see that occasionally the diversity in a non- A B C
